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INTRODUCTION
Economics has been referred to as "the dismal
science," an appellation which probably stems from
Thomas Malthus' 18th century essay on population,1 in which he predicted dire consequences for
the world's people as a consequence of rapid rates
of population growth. While the immediate conclusions from some of our research on the economics of
crime may seem to contribute to a dismal outlook,
we would prefer to argue that a problem is dismal
only if we cannot see a clear path to a solution and
thus run out of hope.
A recent headline in the Los Angeles Times2 read
"L.A. C-ime Rate Could Collapse Justice System,
Computer Says." Allowing for the tendency of the
press to attribute occult powers to computers, we
find that a research team from the University of
Southern California has predicted a possible collapse of the system of criminal justice in Los Angeles as a consequence of an overload on facilities
at all levels. However, from an examination of the
formal documentation of the work performed by
the USC group, it appears that their analysis was
based on a "simplistic" inertial model in which
crime generation and crime countermeasures were
treated as inertial forces. Although this very extensive study has produced projections that will be
* The authors wish to acknowledge the support of the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, United States Department of Justice, under
whose auspices the original research for this paper was
conducted. Continuing research on these topics is presently being supported by the California Council on
Criminal Justice-Task Force on Science and Technology Ph.D., Harvard University, 1969; Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa
Barbara.
t Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1968;
Associate Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara.
I The reference was "to respectable professors of the
dismal science." T. CAnL-sLE, LATIER DAY
PA I r=Ts, No. 1 (1850).
2Drummond, L.A. Crime Rate Could Collapse Justice
System, Computer Says, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 13,
1970, § B, at 1, col. 4. This story was based upon
McEachern, el al., Criminal Justice Simulation Study:
Some Preliminary Projections, June 30, 1970 (Public
Systems Research Institute, U.S.C.).
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invaluable in alerting policy-makers to the very
real consequences of allowing present trends to go
unchecked, it does little to provide an understanding of how the criminal justice system will respond
to continuing rates of change. This is because simplistic inertial models are not designed to analyze
underlying processes, and consequently do not
yield an understanding of how a system works, nor
do they provide clues to action necessary for controlling the various forces within a system.
The dire predictions about the consequences of
continually rising crime rates raise a number of
questions. Where do we break into this system to
bring crime levels within reasonable limits? Are
there alternative approaches or solutions to the
problem? What will happen to law enforcement effectiveness and crime rates if we continue with
present expenditure policies? How much would it
cost to keep law enforcement effectiveness from deteriorating? Can we afford to hold constant or
reduce the current level of offenses?
In this study we have utilized the techniques of
economics for evaluating and controlling economic
systems in an analysis of crime control. Using the
most recently available data including that from
the Uniform Crime Reporting Section of the FBI
and the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics,
our study analyzes the processes generating crime,
the productivity of law enforcement agencies, and
welds these two processes together in a model that
permits an analysis of underlying causes and the
various appropriate responses to the crime problem.
ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

This study is based on a model which incorporates interaction between the process that generates
crime and the system of law enforcement. We
postulate that law enforcement not only responds
to crime for the purpose of meting out punishment,
but more importantly that it creates a deterrent
effect which tempers the process of crime generation. In this more sophisticated model, one of the
potential theoretical outcomes will still be the collapse of the criminal justice system. More important for our purposes, however, is the use of such a
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model to critically examine the processes of crime
generation and crime control.
Our study deals primarily with the major felonies which may be classified as economic crimes:
crimes for which there is a clear-cut economic
motive. Many of the results, however, are more
general in nature and will apply to non-economic
crimes as well. Our analysis conveniently breaks
down into three parts. We will deal separately with
the process of crime generation and with the analysis of law enforcement viewed as a service industry,
finally synthesizing these results to create an interacting system. This system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. The logic of this schematic is
as follows: Law enforcement is viewed as acting on
offenses and clearing them by arrest. The effectiveness of law enforcement is determined by technol-

ogy and expenditures on law enforcement. The effectiveness of law enforcement is, in turn, presumed
to affect the behavior-of offenders. In addition to
law enforcement, attitudes and economic conditions are postulated to determine offense rates. The
inclusion of the impact of the judicial and correctional systems on offense rates is illustrated by
broken lines to indicate that these systems have
not been analyzed in the present study, but could
readily be incorporated within this conceptual
framework.
In our empirical analysis of crime generation we
included larceny, burglary, auto theft, and robbery
as defined and reported in the Uniform Crime Reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our
study breaks the population down into subsets
classified by age, sex, and race. There are sound
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group. What do we know about their set of alternatives? If we look at the data for the period 1952
through 1967 (Fig. 2) we find that unemployment
rates for white males go from a low of 7.0% in 1952
to a high of 16.5% in 1958, then decline erratically
to 9.0% in 1967. Over the same period, unemployment rates for non-whites go from a low of 10.0%
in 1952 to a high of 27.2% in 1959, then decline to
20.1% in 1967. By contrast, average unemployment rates for the total labor force never rise above
6.8% over this entire period.
Another measure of the economic well-being of a
population subset is the group's labor force particiCnm= GENFaATION
pation rate. This is a measure of the proportion of
For several centuries criminologists have been the group who are either employed or actively seeksuggesting economic motives as one of the possible ing work. A decline in participation rates for youths
causes of property crimes. Illegal gains are an al- generally comes about for one of two reasons. An
ternative to income earned honestly. The critical individual may be attending school, or he may be
question is how does one choose between socially so despondent about the possibility of obtaining
acceptable and illegal alternatives for earning in- work that he leaves the labor force. Referring to
come. Here economic theory can make an impor- Fig. 3, we observe that in terms of their participatant contribution. Theory tells us that a rational tion rates, 18-19 year olds are worse off than the
individual will, implicitly at least, consider all of population as a whole, and non-whites are again
the alternatives open to him in terms of a benefit- relatively disadvantaged.
The impact of school enrollment on this process
cost analysis. From normal employment, the
benefit is a stream of wage payments. The associ- is also important. Going to school represents an inated costs include the every-day costs of acquiring vestment in greater future earning power for the
and maintaining a job. In the case of a crime, the individual. A rational individual will look at the
benefits are any returns from its commission. The lifetime possibilities associated with greater schoolcosts include the direct costs associated with the ing as compared to immediate full time employactual commission of a crime; advance research, ment. The array of opportunities facing an 18-19
transportation, the transactions' costs of disposing year old thus has a time dimension and includes
of illegally obtained goods.' In addition, there may schooling as one of the legal activities from which
be the costs associated with being apprehended, in- he can choose. However, the choice of further educluding the cost of having an arrest on one's rec- cation may also depend on immediate employment
ord, the cost for legal defense, the loss of income opportunities, since schooling requires an immedifrom being incarcerated, and the psychic cost of ate investment for a return that may commence
being branded a criminal. The expected cost of years hence. Consequently, lacking either savings
these latter possibilities will be the cost associated or a job, the opportunity to attend school may be
with the event multiplied by the probability that eliminated from an individual's alternatives for
the event (arrest, trial, imprisonment) takes place. reasons beyond his control. Referring to Fig. 4,
When our rational individual considers this whole which depicts statistics for school enrollment, we
array of possibilities he will quite naturally choose find that in 1952, 38.1% of 18-19 year old white
that activity which yields him the greatest net ma- males were enrolled in school. This may be conterial and psychic benefits. Should some elements trasted with 34.6% for non-white males of the same
of this choice set be eliminated for any reason, the age. By 1967 these figures had risen to 61.5% and
individual would, of course, choose from those al- 53.5% respectively. Once more we see that nonwhites have become relatively disadvantaged.
ternatives remaining.
To study the impact of economic opportunity for
choice
The next step is to see how this theory of
relates to economic realities for the 18-19 year old youth on their criminal activity one can formulate
a probability model of behavior based on a populaIThe benefit (value) the criminal receives from
illegal goods may be considerably less than the market tion breakdown by labor force characteristics.
price.
Figure 5 is a Venn diagram of such a breakdown. It
reasons for this. For example, the evidence shows
rather emphatically that these crimes are largely a
youthful phenomenon. We find that both the distribution of crimes by age and the rates of increase
of crimes by age are greater for the ages under
twenty. Consequently, we selected 18-19 year olds
as an appropriate group to study. We found further
that for these crimes, except for larceny, 94% or
more are committed by males in the 18-19 year old
group. For larceny the figure is 75%. We also observed that arrest patterns vary by race for reasons
which became apparent as the study progressed.
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is obvious that crimes committed by this age group
must involve individuals in one of the subsets of
the total 18-19 year old population. The shaded
area in the center represents those who have committed crimes in a given year. If we believe that
employment status and school enrollment status
affect the individual's inclination to commit a
crime, then we would expect the probability of arrest to vary according to the subset of the population in which an individual is found. As noted
above, we know that the number of individuals in
each of these categories varies over time and have
data on this variation. We also have data on how
arrest rates for 18-19 year olds vary over the same
period. If we use arrest rates as a measure of the
probability of arrest and the data on school enrollment and labor force status to represent the probability of being in one of these population groups, we
can estimate the impact of changing school enrollment and job opportunities on arrest rates. We find

that we can "explain" 98% of the variation in
arrest rates for 18 and 19 year olds by changes in
4
their economic opportunities.
This suggests that an improvement in economic
opportunities for youth in terms of some form of
education or immediate employment will have an
ameliorating effect on youthful crime rates. This in
itself is hardly a new idea. Although sociologists
have been asserting this for some time, the important thing here is that solid statistical verification of this relationship is provided within a formally specified analytical frameworkA
The policy implication from our result is that
4H. VoTEY & L. Pmm.LIps, EcoNOmC CarHis:
THEm GENERATION, DETERRENCE AND CONTROL 41,

23a, 27a (National Technical Information Service
P B 194 984, 1969).
5 For the development of our analytical framework
and a discussion of earlier studies by others, see Phillips,
Votey & Maxwell, Crine, Youth, and the Labor Market,
80 J.PoL. EcoN. 491 (1972).
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there is a trade-off between policies which control
crime and those which affect the generation of
crime. An important aspect of the latter policy is a
cumulative one. The evidence on recidivism is discouraging. Once an individual commences on a
pathway of crime as the source of economic sustenance, it is difficult to reroute him toward socially
acceptable earning activities for a number of
reasons. Thus, any measures which tend to remove
the incentive for crime generation may have both
an important immediate effect on crime rates and
a more important long-run effect on the level of
crime.

LAW ENFORCEMENT PRODUCTION FUNCTION

So far we have analyzed crime generation on the
assumption that the impact of law enforcement on
the process is constant. Since we cannot be sure
this is true it is equally important to analyze the
process of law enforcement from an economic point
of view. To an economist, a law enforcement agency
may be viewed in essentially the same manner as a
firm in a service industry. A firm will maximize
profits, given the prices it can charge for its services
and the cost of inputs. Similarly, a law enforcement
agency will maximize its output, given the annual
budget determined by some external public body.
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To acquire a conceptual understanding of the
analysis of such an agency from an economic point
of view, refer to Fig. 6. The activity of the agency
(police department) may be regarded as a process
into which flows an array of reported offenses.
Police personnel operate on these offenses utilizing
their time and capital equipment consisting of
patrol cars, communication equipment, laboratories, etc., and produce a list of crimes cleared by arrest. For our analysis, we do not concern ourselves
with the disposition of those arrested, but only assume the process works beyond the point of arrest.
The production function approach to law enforcement serves to emphasize a very important
point. If offense rates are increasing, expenditures

on law enforcement must be increased fast enough,
or police effectiveness will fall. The necessary rate
of increase in expenditures can be determined. If
the offense rate increases and there is no increase in
expenditures on law enforcement and no improvement in law enforcement technology, offenses
cleared by arrest will increase but at a diminishing
rate, as police resources are stretched more thinly.
Beyond some point police will be unable to clear
further crimes without being allotted additional
resources. Consequently, police effectiveness as
measured by the clearance ratio (the ratio of offenses cleared by arrest to offenses) will fall. (Refer
to Fig. 7.) Conversely, if the offense rate is not
changing and there are increases in expenditures or
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The ratio of shaded area to total area, which may be measured by age, specific arrest rates for any given age
population, represents the probability of arrest.
improvements in technology, police effectiveness
will increase. If both offense rates and expenditures
are increasing, the nature of the relationship between inputs and outputs will determine the impact
on police effectiveness.
The important thing is that it is possible to estimate statistically the parameters of this production
relationship. Based on national experience we can
determine what percentage of increase in clearances
one might expect with a one-percent increase in
police manpower or from a one-percent increase in
capital equipment. This information is of importancein making general estimates of how to allocate
resources for the control of a particular crime, given

that we wish to obtain a particular outcome in
terms of the level of clearances for that crime.
These "elasticities," i.e., percentage changes in
output for a given one-percent change in one of the
inputs, are shown in Table I.
One would expect a relatively larger coefficient
on Other Expenditures on Law Enforcement for
crimes which require a more intensive use of capital
in their solution. The crimes which we find to be
more capital intensive by this reasoning are robbery
and auto theft. These results seem to be consistent
with a casual inspection of law enforcement experience. Robbery appears to be a crime whose solution
depends upon a high degree of mobility of the
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police force and on communications since typical
robberies are committed in areas in which continued surveillance is virtually impossible. Clearances for auto theft also seem to depend upon the
mobility of the police force and more recently on
computerized tracing techniques, all highly capital
intensive. Thus it should not be surprising that
Other Expenditures appears more important in
these estimated relationships. On the other hand,
burglary solutions seem to depend more upon
analytical techniques of a detective force and upon
surveillance. Here we find that Police Personnel is
a more important input in terms of the relative
size of the coefficients. The solution of larceny
(theft) depends almost entirely on surveillance and
once more the variable Police Personnel is relatively more important than Other Expenditures on
Law Enforcement.
The policy implications of these results are illustrated for the case of robbery in Fig. 8. The solid
line represents the actual experience of police in
clearing crimes over the period studied. Over this
is superimposed the predicted values based on our
production function.
Our estimated production function fits the actual
experience quite well. We see that whereas expenditures forlaw enforcement (policepersonnel and other
expenditures on law enforcement) were rising fairly
steadily over the entire period, offenses, which remained fairly steady through 1960, were rising
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much more rapidly from that year on. The consequence of this was that police effectiveness deteriorated rapidly in the latter period following a
moderate rise from 1952-1957. If there had been a
properly balanced increase in police personnel and
other expenditures on law enforcement from 1960
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TABLE I

onward to offset the rise in offenses, law enforcement agencies would have been able to maintain
the level of police effectiveness.

EmcnvENlss OF INPUTS INTO THE
LAW ENZoRcEC ENT SYSTEM

SIMULTANEOUS SYSTEM O CRDE

Percentage Change in the Crimes
Cleared by Arrest for a One Percent
Change in

GENERATION AND CONTROL

Crime
Police

Offenses

Larceny .........
Burglary .........
Auto Theft .......
Robbery .........

Personnel

.628
.186
.546
.529

Other
Expenditures

on Law

Enforcement

:405
.722

.143
.303
.287
.131

*
*
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* Police personnel did not have a statistically
significant impact on crimes cleared by arrest for auto
theft and robbery.
Source: Votey & Phillips, Poice Effectiveness: The
Law Enforcement Production Function, 1 J. LEGAL
STIm s 423 (1972).

At this point, We have two relationships which
comprise a simplified model of crime generation and
control. Referring to Fig. 1, we recall that deterrence is the link between crime control and crime
generation. Fig. 9 shows clearance ratios for the
index crimes from 1952 to 1967 for the cities covered by the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI.
The clearance ratio is both an index of police effectiveness in apprehending criminals and a measure of the probability of a criminal being arrested
for a single offense. This probability should enter
the potential criminal's cost calculations when he is
choosing between economic alternatives. As the
clearance ratio falls with no change in other variaCLEARANCE RATIO

PREDICTED CLEARANCE RATIO
------ TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFENSES
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bles in the system we would expect more criminal
activity since the probability of arrest has fallen.
This is in fact what we have observed. Figure 10
shows the alarming rise in offenses over the same
time period.
The interaction of rising offenses with an insuffident rise in expenditures for law enforcement
has resulted in the clearance ratio tracing a pattern resembling an inverted U as illustrated in Figs.
8 and 9. The two relationships we have derived are
illustrated in Fig. 1la in such a manner as to reveal
the interaction between them. The clearance ratio
is plotted on the vertical axis. If law enforcement
activity were completely successful the clearance
ratio would be 1.0, i.e., clearances would equal offenses. The lower limit to the ratio is zero. For a
given level of police technology and law enforcement expenditures, we would expect the clearance
ratio to fall as offenses rise. Law enforcement personnel will be spread thinner and thinner in terms
of the job they face, until only a small proportion
of crimes is effectively dealt with. This relationship
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of the clearance ratio and the offense rate (point A)
for a given level of expenditures and state of technology for law enforcement and a given state of
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enforcement expenditures rise or the state of technology improves, the crime-control curve will rotate upward and to the right. (The endpoint on the
vertical axis representing a clearance ratio of one
will remain fixed.) As economic conditions or social
attitudes worsen the crime generation function will
also tend to rotate in this same manner. If economic
conditions worsen or social attitudes deteriorate,
expenditures will have to increase in order to maintain the effectiveness of law enforcement. However,
even in this case the offense rate will rise. If the
equilibrium had been at some point C to the right
of A and there had been a change in socio-economic
conditions (e.g., a decline in unemployment rates)
to shift the crime generation function such that the
new equilibrium would be at A, we would find that
the level of the clearance ratio, as indicated by C
on the crime control function, produces a greater
probability of arrest than that anticipated by
criminals. In successive moves a lower level of
offenses will prevail until we reach the equilibrium
point of A. Should offenses have been below A, a
similar but opposite situation would exist such that

we would find a lower clearance ratio than anticipated and crimes would rise until the system is once
more in balance. This stable equilibrium represents
the situation which we believe prevails in the
United States at this time.
6
An example is the case of auto theft, in which
we note that the equilibrium is stable. A decline
of 0.75 percent in the clearance ratio will induce a
one-percent increase in the offense rate, which in
turn only causes a decline of 0.66 percent in the
clearance ratio. Thus we see that changes precipitated by shifts in crime generation (or shifts in
crime control caused by changes in law enforcement expenditures) will damp out and for auto
theft the system will approach a point like A.
Consequently, the system remains subject to
control.
Using the results of simultaneously estimated
6It should not be surprising that auto theft, which of
the seven major felonies had one of the lowest average
clearance ratios (26%) over the period 1952-1967, had
one of the highest average offense rates (264 auto thefts
per 100,000 population), suggesting that a low level of
deterrence is directly linked to a high level of offenses.
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relationships such as those we estimated independently for the crime generation function and law
enforcement production function, it is possible to
calculate some of the alternative rates of change
for the clearance ratio and offense rates for auto
theft which would have been possible to achieve
by varying law enforcement expenditures.7 These
are presented in Table II. We observe that during
this period the per capita offense rate for auto theft
was growing at 6.1% per year, and the rate of
offenses cleared by arrest per capita was growing
at 4.8% per year. Consequently, the clearance
ratio was falling at the average rate of 1.3% per
year. Implementation of the estimated relationships yields the results that per capita expenditures
on law enforcement should have increased at the
rate of 3.6% per year to keep the clearance ratio
from falling. In fact, law enforcement expenditures
were growing at only 2.9% per year. Even if
expenditures on law enforcement had grown at
3.6% per year, the per capita offense rate for auto'
theft would have risen at 4.5% per year. It would
have been necessary to increase per capita expenditures on law enforcement at the rate of 5.4%
per year to maintain the auto theft offense rate at
a constant level during this period. Referring to
Table II we see that if there had been no decrease
in law enforcement effectiveness (0% rate of
growth of the clearance ratio) offenses would have
grown by 4.5% compared to the actual rate of
increase of 6.1%. We conclude that approximately
75% of the observed rise in offense rates is attributable to changes in crime generation forces and only
25% to the failure to maintain law enforcement
effectiveness.
The finding of stability over this period gives
no grounds for complacency, however, for we can
envision another altogether different situation. It
7 The estimated functional relationships are:
InCRt = Ink + Xt + (a - 1)nOt + elnEt
nOt = Inj + Ot + -nCRt + aln(pp)t,
where CR, 0, t, and pp are defined as the clearance ratio#
offense rate, time, and the product of the umemployment
rate and participation rate, respectively. Time is included in the crime control function to measure changes
in productivity due to technological change and in the
crime generation function to measure systematic
changes in social attitudes. The estimates for auto theft
are:
a
0.339

0.222

-1.330

-0.193

X
0.022

0
0.045

A detailed explanation of the calculations for Table II
can be found m Votey & Phillips, supra note 4, App. C,
at 5.

TABLE II
PossIBLE

CHANGES IN ANNUAL MzAsunEs roR AUTO

THErT GivN Cmn GENERAION FoRCES AND
ALTERNATIVE RATEs or GRoWTH or EXPENDITmES
ON LAW ENEORcEm NT
Expenditureso
Law Enforcement

Consequent Changes
of Clearance Ratio

Resultant Increase
in Offense Rates

2.9%
3.6
5.4

-1.3%
0.0
3.3

6.1%
4.5
0.0

is conceivable that police effectiveness could fall
so low that we approach another equilibrium point
as shown at B. Here we have an unstable equilibrium such that a shock to the system moving us
in either direction from B will find no correcting
force to bring about a return.
Should the law enforcement production function
shift upward from LEPF to LEPF', as illustrated
in Fig. 11c, as a consequence of a rise in expenditures on law enforcement, starting from B we
would find an increased probability of arrest leading to a decrease in offenses. We would reach a
new stable equilibrium at A'.
Suppose, however, that instead unemployment
rates increase so that the crime generation function
shifts from CGF to CGF' as illustrated in Fig.
Ilb. In this case the clearance ratio (and the probability of arrest expected by criminals) will be
lower than anticipated and crimes will increase
unchecked with the system out of control. This
is the analogue in the sophisticated model to the
collapse predicted by the simplistic inertial model.
There is another dynamic and presently unevaluated aspect of this system. It is conceivable
that there may be an indirect and possibly inverse
relationship between expenditures on law enforcement and the shape of the crime generation function. A heavy emphasis on law enforcement to
the neglect of economic conditions could have the
effect of worsening social attitudes in the form of
a resentment of law enforcement and a general
attitude of antagonism between levels of society.
SUMmy
The value of the sophisticated model is that
the outcome results from a number of plausible
causes. Policy makers at one level may simply
not be providing sufficient resources to combat
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crime, while policy makers at another level may
not be taking sufficient action to maintain economic opportunities for an important segment
of the population. In addition, social attitudes
may be changing as a consequence of what leaders
on all levels do or fail to do in attempting to cope
with serious social problems. The solution to the
problem is largely one of society's being willing
to pay both the costs of law and order and the
costs of maintaining healthy economic conditions
and social attitudes. In the past we simply have
not kept abreast of the problem.
What then is the appropriate policy for the
nation or the state to follow to control crime? It
is clear to us that law enforcement should be bol-
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stered substantially. We are also convinced that
such measures alone may be insufficient. We must
control crime generation for two reasons. First,
this is the only way to guarantee that we have
control of both processes and thus can maintain
social stability and, second, because the social
cost of crime through recidivism is certain to be
lower if we remove the incentives for the first
offense. Our model serves to emphasize a point
made by ex-Attorney General of the United States,
Ramsey Clark, who said, "Law enforcement can
only deal with the symptoms of crime. It's like
bailing out the basement without turning off the
water." We are in favor both of turning off the
water and bailing out the basement.

